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UCLA LAW REVIEW

Auctions, Taxes, and Air
Dave Owen
Abstract
In recent California litigation, a group of plaintiffs argued that California’s greenhouse
gas emissions auction is a form of taxation. California law requires supermajority votes
for new taxes, and the emissions auction did not initially receive a supermajority vote, so
the argument, if successful, would have rendered unconstitutional a key part of one of
the world’s most prominent emissions markets. In April 2017, the California Court of
Appeals rejected that argument, and the California Legislature later enacted legislation
providing the auction system with a supermajority, mooting the question—for now.
But similar questions could arise in the future, or in other jurisdictions that choose to
auction emissions share.
This article argues that the California courts reached the right result, and that auction
charges are not taxes, but for reasons somewhat different from those offered by the
California courts. When a government auctions emissions shares, it is selling the right
to use a public resource. When governments sell other public resources, like mineral
or timber, they usually charge money. When they do not charge or charge too little,
the reasons are typically grounded in politics rather than legal constraints. Air should
not be different, and emissions auction charges therefore should not be vulnerable to
charges that they are a form of taxation.
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INTRODUCTION
Is auctioning emission shares1 a form of taxation? The question might
initially seem odd, since environmental economists and lawyers are
accustomed to thinking of carbon taxes as an alternative to emissions trading.2
The legal argument that an emissions auction is a form of taxation is novel.3
Nevertheless, that novel idea was recently before California’s Third
District Court of Appeal, which, in a divided decision, declined to treat
auction charges as taxes.4 Although the California Supreme Court recently
denied cert, and the California Legislature mooted the issue for the time
being with a supermajority vote extending the program,5 future reauthorizations
of California’s emissions auctions could give rise to similar questions.6 Until the
2017 legislation passed, more was at stake than mere semantics. California, like
many states, has constitutional provisions requiring supermajorities to enact
new or increased taxes. The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006
(commonly known as AB 32), which authorized California’s emissions
auctions as part of a sweeping program for regulating greenhouse gas
emissions, did not receive a supermajority.7 So if emissions auctions were a
form of taxation, a key component of the implementation scheme for a landmark
statute was—until recently—unconstitutional.

1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

An emissions auction is one component of a cap-and-trade system. Cap-and-trade systems
define a fixed cap on emissions of a pollutant, allocate shares of that cap to individual firms
or governmental entities, and allow those entities to trade shares. In an auction, firms and
governmental entities must bid for shares rather than receive them for free. See infra notes 19–39
(describing cap-and-trade systems and auctions in more detail).
See, e.g., Charles Frank, Pricing Carbon: A Carbon Tax or Cap-and-Trade?, BROOKINGS:
PLANETPOLICY (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2014/08/
12/pricing-carbon-a-carbon-tax-or-cap-and-trade [http://perma.cc/NNP4-GJZP] (“A carbon tax
is one way to put a price on emissions. Cap-and-trade is another.”).
See infra notes 63–70 (describing the litigation that first raised this issue). In the political realm,
in contrast, labeling any sort of governmental charge a tax is a tried-and-true strategy that
many opponents deploy to fight federal climate legislation. See, e.g., “Cap and Trade” - National
Energy Tax, U.S. CONGRESSMAN BILL POSEY, http://posey.house.gov/issues/issue
/?IssueID=5031 [http://perma.cc/B4XY-WZ4E].
Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 (Ct. App. 2017).
See Cara Horowitz, California Extends Its Cap-and-Trade Program Through 2030, LEGAL PLANET
(July 17, 2017), http://legal-planet.org/2017/07/17/california-extends-its-cap-and-tradeprogram-through-2030 [https://perma.cc/7PEU-56LR].
See Andy Coghlan & Danny Cullenward, State Constitutional Limitations on the Future of
California’s Carbon Market, 37 ENERGY L.J. 219, 222 (2016) (noting the need for future
reauthorizations).
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2014)).
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Because similar questions could arise elsewhere, the case may have
implications extending beyond California. Cap-and-trade schemes are becoming
more prevalent, and more jurisdictions are using auctions to allocate at least some
of their emissions shares.8 If climate law expands, as many people hope it will,
both regulatory tools could see greatly increased use. Constitutional restrictions
on taxation are also part of the law in many states, and antitax politics are very
nearly universal. Additionally, governments are increasingly turning to
regulatory fees, which fund regulatory initiatives by charging regulated
entities instead of drawing from general tax revenues.9 The turn toward fees
has raised questions about how to distinguish regulatory fees from taxes.10
It also raises questions about which side of that divide auction charges fall on
or whether they occupy a distinct third category.
This Essay argues for a distinct third category.11 When government
auctions emissions shares, it is not imposing taxes or traditional regulatory fees.
Instead, government is doing for air what it has often done with other public
resources: requiring private users to pay for their use. An emissions auction, in
other words, is—as its name suggests—a fundamentally transactional form of
regulation, with purchasers securing valuable entitlements to exploit a public
resource. An auction therefore is not taxation any more than it is taxation for a
state to demand payment when private companies extract timber or oil from
public lands. There may be a superficial resemblance because auctions and
taxes (and fees, for that matter) create financial incentives, generate
government revenue, and then use that combination of incentives and
revenue to achieve societal goals.12 From the perspective of a regulated entity,

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text (describing existing auctions).
See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
See Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1997) (holding that a
program imposes fees on lead manufacturers and other contributors to lead pollution imposed fees,
not taxes, and setting forth the legal standard for drawing such distinctions).
There are similarities between the arguments developed here and arguments in an amicus letter
submitted by the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). See Letter from
Nicholas W. van Aelstyn, Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., to Hon. Harry E. Hull, Jr., Acting
Admin. Presiding Judge of the Third Dist. Court of Appeal, Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae for
International Emissions Trading Association (May 23, 2016), https://ieta.wildapricot.org/
resources/California/Law%20Suits/2016/IETA%20Amicus/Amicus%20Letter%20Brief%20of
%20IETA%20Coalition.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4MW-3CGG]. Those parallels are not
entirely coincidental; I did review the IETA’s brief while researching this Essay. I do not,
however, represent the IETA or any other party to the proceeding, and I have not communicated
with the IETA or its counsel. This Essay offers my own independent view.
See Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew R. Schein, Carbon Taxes Versus Cap and Trade: A Critical
Review, 4 CLIMATE CHANGE ECON. 1350010 (2013) (explaining similarities and differences
between taxes and cap-and-trade systems).
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all three options likely feel similar. Legally, however, the differences are
significant.
This Essay develops that argument in three parts. Part I explains the
roots of the conflict. It describes the emergence of emissions auctions and the
growth of antitax constitutional provisions, and then explains how these legal
developments collided with AB 32. Part II explains why auctions are better
understood as transactions allocating public resources rather than as taxes.
That argument, once stated, may seem obvious, and Part III considers why it
has only belatedly emerged within the AB 32 debates. The simplest explanation
is straightforward: It is easy to conflate a historical practice of allowing private
entities to pollute without charge with a legal entitlement to pollute without
charge. The public, however, is not legally bound by its own past largesse. If
California or some other jurisdiction now wishes to charge users for the ability to
pollute public air through emissions auctions, it may do so without treating the
charges as taxes.
This argument comes with one important qualification: I do not mean to
imply that there is something wrong with pollution taxes. The distinctions
among taxes, regulatory fees, and transactional charges do matter, because they
each require different modes of legal authorization.13 These categorizations
also have political implications; few terms are more negatively loaded than “tax.”
But while these distinctions are important, many of the policy arguments that
support auctioning also extend, at least to some degree, to taxes and fees.14
California, in other words, would be entirely justified—and justified for some of
the same reasons that support its cap-and-trade auctions—if it were to enact a
carbon tax. It just has not done so yet.
I.

EMERGING AUCTIONS AND TAX REVOLTS

California’s controversy has its roots in two trends that began, entirely
unrelated, in the 1970s. One was the emergence of incentive-based regulation
as one of the most important ideas in environmental law. The other was an

13.

14.

Some commentators have lamented the practical difficulties of drawing these distinctions, arguing
they should not hold such importance. See, e.g., David Gamage & Darien Shanske, On Tax
Increase Limitations: Part I – A Costly Incoherence, ST. TAX NOTES, Dec. 19, 2011, at 813, 816
(“There is no clear line between what is a tax and what is a fee.”). That is a sensible argument, but
for now, at least, the California Constitution leaves lawyers and judges with no choice but to draw
lines.
For a summary of arguments favoring a carbon tax, see SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A
CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY
(2011).
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antitax revolt. This section briefly describes each and then explains how
emissions auctions have brought them into collision.
A.

Auctions

When Congress and state legislatures drafted the major environmental
statutes of the 1970s, legislators were not thinking about trading or
auctioning emissions. The 1970s statutes instead placed heavy emphasis on
regulatory methods—often pejoratively referred to as “command-and-control”—
that specified pollution control standard that would apply uniformly across
categories of sources.15
Economists soon began to criticize those methods and to propose
alternatives. They began their critique by noting that different regulated firms
often face different costs to achieve similar levels of pollution reduction.16 If
Firm A, with low abatement costs, could reduce pollution levels beyond its
regulatory target and could sell a credit based on the excess reductions, while
Firm B, with high abatement costs, could purchase the credit and reduce its
own emissions a little less, the same environmental outcome could be achieved
(assuming the location of the pollution sources didn’t matter) at a lower economic
cost.17 Perhaps, also, the prospect of selling emissions credits would encourage
Firm A, or a third party, to accelerate research and development of pollution
control technologies.18 Traditional command-and-control regulation did not
allow these benefits, or so the critique went, but perhaps alternative regulatory
approaches would.
This appealing insight spawned what environmental lawyers and
economists now call cap-and-trade systems.19 In its simplest form, a cap-andtrade system sets an overall cap on emissions of a pollutant.20 Polluters then
receive shares of the cap, and they can buy and sell those shares.21 Often the cap
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era
From an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3 (1991).
Id. at 6.
See id. at 8–10.
See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic
Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 183 (1988). But see David M.
Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10094 (2003) (questioning the argument that an emissions trading program will spur
research and development into emissions controls, at least for emissions trading schemes that do
not use auctions).
See Lesley K. McAllister, Cap-and-Trade, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 341
(Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. 2014).
Id. at 341.
Id.
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will decline over time, but polluters can also sometimes “bank[]” future
emissions entitlements by accelerating their reductions and then reserving some
credit for future use.22 In practice, cap-and-trade systems are almost always
more complicated than this simple sketch might suggest, and designing
effective cap-and-trade systems has turned out to be a significant challenge.23
But many such systems do exist.24 While air quality regulation remains the
most prominent application of cap-and-trade concepts, similar systems now
populate many subfields of environmental and natural resources law.25
In all of these subfields, cap-and-trade system designers must confront
questions about how to initially allocate entitlements.26 One option, which
many early cap-and-trade systems used, is to allocate pollution shares on the
basis of historic activity.27 For most regulated entities, that is the least disruptive,
and therefore the most politically palatable approach (other than no regulation at
all).28 But grandfathering creates problems. It rewards the very behavior the
cap-and-trade system now seeks to discourage, because if pollution shares are
allocated on the basis of historic pollution, the heaviest polluters will receive the
largest shares.29 Allocating shares on the basis of historic emissions also places
new market entrants at a relative disadvantage; unlike established firms, which
receive allocations for free, new entrants will have to pay for their emissions—
even if they are much more efficient than their competition.30 Finally, if
polluting is a privilege, not an entitlement, then a scheme that allocates

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 368 (1989).
See Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40
ENVTL. L. 1195, 1196 (2010) (describing the significant informational challenges
associated with cap-and-trade programs).
See generally MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS
FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds.,
2007) (describing different uses of incentive-based regulation, including cap-and-trade
systems).
See Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, in MOVING TO MARKETS
IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 24, at 63 (describing a variety of
applications for cap-and-trade systems).
See McAllister, supra note 19, at 344–45.
Id. at 345.
See Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction
Not Grandfather, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 333, 343 (2002) (noting that regulated industries
generally prefer grandfathering to auctions).
See McAllister, supra note 19, at 345.
See William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and Disappointments: Lessons for Climate
Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 38–
39 (2010).
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emission shares based on historic practices is effectively giving an important
privilege away for free.31
For these reasons, many environmental economists have advocated
auctioning emissions shares.32 Some lawmakers have responded to that call.
The architects of the federal sulfur dioxide trading program,33 the State of
Virginia’s nitrogen oxide trading program,34 the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative,35 and the European Union’s greenhouse gas emissions trading
system,36 to name some of the examples, have all used auctions. Outside the
realm of air pollution control (and the United States’ borders), several countries
have used auctioning to allocate catch shares for fisheries.37 Many cap-andtrade programs do not auction entitlements, or auction only a subset of
entitlements; there is no consensus political view about the appropriate path
forward.38 Among economists, however, auctioning emissions now enjoys
widespread support.39
Another feature of the debate over cap-and-trade systems also bears
mentioning. Taxes often come up in academic debates about cap-and-trade
systems, but they are addressed as alternatives to cap-and-trade.40 This has

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See N. Gregor Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Invitation to Join the Pigou Club, 35 E. ECON. J. 14, 18
(2009) (“Why should an electric utility, for example, be given a valuable resource simply because
it has for years polluted the environment? That does not strike me as equitable.”). In fact,
giving away entitlements will often create an additional windfall, since regulated firms are able
to increase charges to consumers while they themselves bear little or no additional cost. See Jacob
K. Goeree et al., An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution
Permits, 8 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 514, 515 (2010) (describing windfall profits secured by a
German company); Markus Wråke et al., Opportunity Cost for Free Allocations of Emissions
Permits: An Experimental Analysis, 46 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 331, 332–33 (2010).
See, e.g., Karl Hausker, The Politics and Economics of Auction Design in the Market for Sulfur
Dioxide Pollution, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 553, 559 (1992) (“The literature on
pollution markets suggests that auctions can help overcome problems of market inefficiency.”).
See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons From SO2
Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71 (1998).
See David Porter et al., The Design, Testing and Implementation of Virginia’s NOx Allowance Auction,
69 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 190 (2009).
CO2 Auctions, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/market/
co2_auctions [http://perma.cc/FVX8-XRMS].
See Auctioning, EUR. COMMISSION (July 27, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets/auctioning_en [http://perma.cc/9D4V-VART] (“Auctioning is the default method of
allocating allowances within the EU emissions trading system . . . .”).
See, e.g., John Lynham, How Have Catch Shares Been Allocated?, 44 MARINE POL’Y 42, 43 (2014).
See Cramton & Kerr, supra note 28, at 343 (lamenting regulated industries’ opposition to auctions,
which are often politically successful).
See, e.g., Lynham, supra note 37, at 43 (“Most economists would advocate that the best method for
allocating a publicly held resource to private individuals is through an auction.”).
See, e.g., Goulder & Schein, supra note 12, at 1350010–2 (noting “much debate” about whether a
cap-and-trade or a tax-based system is superior).
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been particularly true for climate change.41 Many economists and lawyers have
argued that a carbon tax is the optimal policy response to climate change, and
hundreds of pages of articles and books have debated the relative merits of capand-trade systems and taxes.42 Participants in those debates often note that
both systems share similarities; both are regulatory instruments that, at their
core, function as mechanisms for placing prices on carbon and using those
prices to drive down emissions.43 The cap-and-trade versus tax debates would
never have been so extensive, however, if economic and legal experts believed
that cap-and-trade systems and taxes really were the same thing. That
proposition, instead, would come from litigants.
B.

Tax and Fee Limitations

While economists began contemplating the possibility of incentive-based
regulation for carbon emissions, the citizens of California were revolting against
taxes.44 In 1978, in response to a widespread perception that local property taxes
were excessively high and rising too fast, Californian voters enacted Proposition
13, which established limitations on local tax rates and tax hikes.45 In the
years since, other initiatives have followed, each designed to restrict the ability of
state and local governments to raise revenue.46 Consequently, California taxes
can be raised, if at all, only by legislative supermajorities.47 And while California
was a pioneer in the antitax revolts, it was not alone.48 States across the country
have constitutionalized similar restrictions.49
Though Californians restricted state and local taxation, they did not revise
their expectations for government services, and that placed state and local

41.
42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g.,; Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable Permits to Control
U.S. Greenhouse Gases, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 42 (2009) (advocating cap-and-trade
systems); William D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global
Warming, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 26 (2007) (advocating taxes).
See Goulder & Schein, supra note 12, at 1350010–2.
See generally ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS: THE
LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 (1995) (describing Proposition 13’s history and aftereffects).
CAL. CONST. art. 13A; see Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1992).
See Schmeer v. County of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 356–64 (Ct. App. 2013) (describing
Propositions 13, 218, and 26).
See id. at 357, 359, 361 (noting requirements for two-thirds majorities).
See Clyde Haberman, The California Ballot Measure That Inspired a Tax Revolt, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/us/the-california-ballot-measure-that-inspireda-tax-revolt.html?_r=0.
See Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 866 (2012) (“Over thirty states
have some combination of constitutional or statutory tax and expenditure limitations . . . .”).
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governments in a quandary.50 Government still had to be funded somehow, and
one possible response was to turn from taxes to fees. Beyond generating
revenue, fees have policy arguments in their favor. Most importantly, fee
programs can assign the burdens of funding government in at least rough
proportion to the public burdens created by fee-payers’ activities. Consequently,
governments charged the public for many services that once would have been
funded from general tax revenues, which, in turn, sparked further backlash and
subsequent constitutional amendments.51 Neither the California Legislature
nor the voters has eliminated the use of regulatory fees as a potential funding
mechanism, but local governments’ ability to impose fees is now quite
constrained.52
One consequence of the limitations on taxing authority and the resulting
turn to fees has been to make the distinction between fees and taxes very
important.53 If state or local governments could label any revenue instrument
as a regulatory fee, even if that instrument is designed solely to support the
general fund, they might circumvent the constitutional limits created by
Proposition 13 and its progeny. Conversely, if courts were to define the tax
category with excessive breadth, a valuable and often fair method of funding
government services would be difficult to use, if not entirely lost.
Many California cases have wrestled with this distinction. Most prominent among them is Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization,54 which
upheld fees imposed under the Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act
and established a three-part standard for distinguishing fees from taxes.55 But
Sinclair Paint is just the tip of a growing iceberg,56 and perhaps the most
important recent dispute involves emissions auctions.

50.
51.
52.
53.

54.
55.
56.

See O’SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 3 (citing Jack Citrin, Do People Want Something for
Nothing? Public Opinion on Taxes and Government Spending, 32 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1979)).
See Schmeer, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 359–64 (describing Proposition 218, from 1992, and Proposition
26, from 2010).
See Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency v. Amrhein, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 491–92 (Ct. App.
2007) (describing requirements created by Proposition 218, which expanded the definition of
tax to encompass some charges previously categorized as fees).
See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 13, at 816 (“Making the fee-tax question so important puts
enormous pressure on tax-fee jurisprudence.”). California’s 2010 constitutional amendment,
which expands the definition of taxes to include some fees, will reduce the importance of that
distinction to some degree and shift the battlegrounds, but it does not eliminate the issue,
particularly for fees enacted pursuant to pre-2010 statutes. See Coghlan & Cullenward, supra
note 6, at 221.
937 P.2d 1350 (1997).
Id.
See, e.g., Cal. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 247 P.3d 112 (Cal. 2011); S.
Cal. Edison Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 120, 139–45 (Ct. App. 2014);
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AB 32 and the Colliding Trends

In 2006, the California Legislature enacted AB 32, a landmark statute
addressing California’s contributions to climate change.57 The statute empowers
the California Air Resources Control Board (CARB) to utilize a wide variety of
regulatory techniques, including “market-based compliance mechanisms.”58
The Legislature did not specifically demand a cap-and-trade system, but that
language about market-based regulation authorized CARB to implement a
cap-and-trade system if it chose to do so, and CARB did indeed adopt a capand-trade program as part of a larger portfolio of regulatory measures.59 CARB
allocated many of the emissions shares on the basis of historic emissions levels,
but it reserved a subset of the shares—approximately 25 percent—to be
auctioned.60
AB 32 provoked vigorous—though, to date, ineffective—opposition.
After failing to stop the bill, some of its opponents turned directly to the voters.
They sponsored a measure that would have stayed implementation of AB 32
until the state’s unemployment rate dropped to 5.5 percent and stayed at that
level for a full year.61 In 2010, however, the California voters overwhelmingly
rejected the measure.62
Opponents then turned to the courts. Rather than taking on the entire
program, a group of regulated industries and their representative associations
zeroed in on the auction.63 Their arguments, distilled down, employ a simple
syllogism:
1.
2.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Under California law, a scheme that produces revenue is either a
regulatory fee or a tax.
California law defines specific criteria for determining when a
revenue-producing measure qualifies as a regulatory fee.

Griffith v. City of Santa Cruz, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 895, 904–06 (Ct. App. 2012); Equilon Enters. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 223 (Ct. App. 2010). This is a just a small sampling.
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2014)).
Id. §§ 38562(c), 38570(a).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95801–96022 (2016).
Id. § 95910.
See Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate Change Policy From the
Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 399, 403 (2013).
See generally id. (describing Proposition 23 and explaining why it was defeated).
See Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 (Ct. App. 2017).
The plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervernors are the California Chamber of Commerce,
Morningstar Packing Company, and the National Association of Manufacturers. The Pacific
Legal Foundation, a firm that pursues impact litigation against environmental and natural
resource regulation, represents Morningstar Packing Company.
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The emissions auction scheme does not meet those specific
criteria.
Therefore, the emissions auction scheme is a tax.64

Had they succeeded with their argument, it would have spelled the end of
emissions auctions in California.65 The argument also could inspire copycat
litigation in other jurisdictions, or even deter other jurisdictions from trying
to set up auction systems. Without auctions, more of the financial cost of
emissions regulation—to the extent that it occurs—would fall upon the public.
In November 2013, a California Superior Court judge in Sacramento
County rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, concluding that the auction charges
enacted pursuant to AB 32 were permissible as regulatory fees.66 The
plaintiffs appealed to California’s Third District Court of Appeal, and on April
6, 2017, a divided panel affirmed the trial court.67 The court began by rejecting,
unanimously, the plaintiffs’ argument that AB 32 did not actually authorize the
auction. Then it turned to the constitutional question. On that issue, the court
was divided. Two justices agreed that the auction charges were not taxes. As the
court explained:
First, the purchase of emissions allowances, whether directly from the
Board at auction or on the secondary market, is a business-driven
decision, not a governmentally compelled decision; second, unlike any
other tax to which we have been referred by the parties, the purchase
of an emissions allowance conveys a valuable property interest—the
privilege to pollute California’s air—that may be freely sold or traded
on the secondary market.68

Justice Harry E. Hull dissented. In his view, participation in the market
was not really voluntary (at least on the facts before the court); the conveyed
interest was not really property;69 and the use of the auction revenues was
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See California Chamber of Commerce et al. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 36–50, Cal. Chamber of
Commerce, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 (No. C075954), 2014 WL 5462660, at *36–50.
The California Legislature has since mooted the issue, at least until 2030, by authorizing the
auction through a supermajority vote. See Horowitz, supra note 5 (noting the passage of AB
398, Assemb. B. 398, 2017 Legis., Reg. Sess. (2017)).
Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters, Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 342012-80001313, (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2013), Morning Star Packing Co. v. Cal. Air Res.
Board, No. 34-2013-80001464, (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2013) .
Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694.
Id. at 716.
See id. at 730 (Hull, J., dissenting). The justices’ fixation on whether emissions entitlements
could be labeled “property” is puzzling because it seems to imply, for reasons that are not at all
clear, that a transaction would be a tax—even if it conveyed a valuable interest from government
to a third party—if that conveyed interest could not be labeled property. But this peculiarity of
the court’s reasoning is not the focus of this Essay.
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indistinguishable from uses of tax revenues. For all of these reasons, he
concluded that the auction charges really were taxes, and thus were
unconstitutional.70
On June 28, 2017, the California Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’
cert petition, bringing this round of the controversy to a close.
II.

“OUR AIR”

One striking feature of the Third District’s decision is its length, and the
extent to which both the appellate and trial court seem to have viewed
California Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Resources Board71 as a difficult case.
If the facts had involved the state auctioning entitlements to take timber off
state lands, the case likely would not strike most observers as difficult. Indeed, it
probably never would have been filed. There is rarely any legal question about
the government’s ability to charge market prices for land or associated public
interests, and no one would characterize a transaction based on fair market value
as a tax. Instead, the primary legal issues that arise when the government sells
land or other related property interests are whether the sale is even authorized
and, if it is, whether the selling price is too low.72 A variety of legal doctrines,
including the public trust doctrine, prohibitions on gifts of public property,
and various statutory constraints, exist at least partly to ensure that
government does not give the public’s resources away too cheaply.73
The central question raised by California Chamber of Commerce—and a
question that none of the court opinions so far has explored in any depth—is
whether air is different. The short answer is that it is not. While every natural
resource has its own distinctive physical nature, and the body of legal authority
defining public rights in air is not nearly as extensive as the comparable bodies
of law for other resources, legal authority clearly establishes that air is a public
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 730–44.
216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694.
See generally Bruce R. Huber, The Fair Market Value of Public Resources, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1515
(2015) (describing the federal government’s tendency to alienate public resources at discounted
prices, or even for free).
See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (2012) (“The Congress declares that it is the policy of the
United States that . . . the United States receive fair market value of the use of the public lands
and their resources unless otherwise provided for by statute.”); CAL. CONST., art. XVI, § 6
(prohibiting gifts of public property); Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)
(“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in
the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”); Alameda County v.
Janssen, 106 P.2d 11, 14 (1940) (discussing California’s constitutional prohibition on gifts of
public property).
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resource. Judicial decisions that consider public rights in air agree that those
rights do exist, and private air rights, though real, are spatially limited and do
not convey a right to pollute.74 Common sense and basic property law principles
also bolster the legal conclusion that air is public, and that private entitlements
to pollute public air, while allowable, need not be given free of charge.
Precedent governing the public nature of air emerges from two primary
bodies of case law, one considering rights to air as space and the other
considering air pollution. The former set of cases consistently affirms that
estates in land carry some ability to use the space immediately above that land,
but they reject arguments that private air rights extend more than a short
distance above the ground. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has noted: “[I]t is well established under federal law that the navigable
airspace is public property not subject to private ownership.”75 In United States
v. Causby,76 the U.S. Supreme Court put the same point even more bluntly:
“The air is a public highway,” the Court stated, and to honor countervailing
private rights would “transfer into private ownership that to which only the
public has a just claim.”77 The Causby Court did note that private land rights
include some air space.78 A private property owner’s right to exploit airspace,
however, extends only a short vertical distance and laterally no further than
the boundaries of her parcel, unless a landowner negotiates an easement with
her neighbor.79
Air pollution cases similarly emphasize the public and governmental
interest in air. The most famous of these cases is Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co.,80 in which Justice Holmes proclaimed that the state, as “quasi-sovereign” has
“an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth
and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall
be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”81
Holmes’s statement, like much of his classic prose, mixes ambiguity with
elegance; he did not elaborate in any great detail about the nature of the public
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See infra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(a)(2) (2000)).
328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
Id. at 261.
Id. at 264 (“[I]t is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must
have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”).
See Taliaferro v. Salyer, 328 P.2d 799, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (“It is well settled in California that
easements for light and air cannot be created by implication but only by express grant or
covenant.”).
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
Id. at 237.
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interests he recognized.82 But nowhere in this case, or elsewhere in the Court’s
jurisprudence, does the Court advance the idea that the state’s interest in its
people’s air must be balanced against a countervailing private ownership
interest in the atmosphere.83 Nor is it part of the law of California. Instead,
California courts have repeatedly stressed that air pollution, while sometimes
legal, does not occur under any claim of right.84
Interestingly, these cases are not the tip of an iceberg of jurisprudence.
Cases in which courts have held forth on public rights in air are rare,
particularly in comparison to the enormous bodies of jurisprudence
considering public rights in water, wildlife, or land.85 Statutory references to
public or private rights in air are also not abundant. To the extent these legal
sources do exist, they agree unanimously that air is public.86 In contrast to the
law of land or water, there is no body of jurisprudence defining the atmosphere
as a private resource.87
The practical difficulties associated with any other regime reinforce the
legal reality that air is public. As legal commentators since Justinian and
Blackstone have noted, air is the ultimate commons.88 We can do very little to

82.
83.

84.
85.
86.

87.
88.

See id.
The Court’s takings jurisprudence, in contrast, does recognize the need to balance public
regulatory authority with spatially limited private property rights to airspace. See, e.g., Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (denying a takings claim based on
regulations that limited Penn Central’s ability to build into its air space).
See, e.g., Communities for a Better Env’t v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d
502, 514 (Ct. App. 2010) (declining to find any vested pollution right, and citing other decisions
agreeing with that principle).
See generally JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 2016)
(devoting over a thousand pages to natural resource law, with many of those pages addressing
tensions between public and private rights).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012) (“The term ‘natural resources’ means land, fish, wildlife, biota,
air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to,
managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States . . . ,
any State or local government . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1703 (West 2007)
(referring to “the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust in these resources”) see
also S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 4 (1970) (noting, in a report on the then-proposed Clean Air Act,
that “air is a public resource”).
Cf., e.g., Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (recognizing private usufructuary rights in
water).
See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526 (1896) (“[T]here are some few things which . . .
must still unavoidably remain in common . . . . Such (among others) are the elements of light, air
and water . . . .” (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *14)), overruled by
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Zack’s, Inc. v. City of Sausalito, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d
797, 805 n.5 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Book II, title I, sections 1 through 5 of the Institutes of Justinian
declare that: ‘1. Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, the
sea, and consequently the shores of the sea . . . .’” (quoting 2 THOMAS COOPER, THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, at tit. I §§ 1–5 (3d ed. 1852))).
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constrain its movement, and it therefore must be shared. Nor can pollution,
once emitted, be controlled; the pollution we release follows paths chosen
largely by wind and rain, not human intervention, and we can neither retract
the pollution we release nor avoid the pollution coming from our neighbors. It
is ours to share whether we like it or not. The classic indicia of private property
ownership—the abilities to establish discrete rights, to exclude others from use,
and to transfer interests—are all missing.89 Not coincidentally, our legal systems
affirm public rights in other resources, like wildlife and water, that are
considerably less difficult for private individuals to control.90 The same reasoning
that supports those public rights extends with even greater force to air.
These arguments do raise one thorny question: If air is public, which
public does it belong to? Is the rightful public owner a local government, a
state, or the nation, or is air exclusively the common heritage of humanity, to
which no state or nation can lay a proprietary claim? One recent article makes
such a claim, asserting that the global nature of greenhouse gases and climate
change precludes any state from asserting a property interest in air.91 But there is
a logical leap involved in concluding that the air within a state cannot be state
property just because that air is affected by a global-scale problem, or because
air itself is globally mixed. By analogy, water is also affected by global problems,
including climate change, and the water cycle is global in its scale, yet that has
not stopped property law from recognizing state interests in physical water
within the state.92 Nor, in the past, has the transboundary nature of air pollution
stopped the U.S. Supreme Court from recognizing a state’s interest “in all the
. . . air within its domain.”93 Perhaps that interest is shared with the interests of
publics at larger geographic scales, but that does not mean the state’s interest
does not exist.

89.

90.

91.
92.
93.

See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 970 (1985)
(asserting that “the right of alienation is a normal incident of private ownership.”); Thomas W.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998) (noting this “air in
the upper atmosphere” is not conducive to private exclusion).
See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (explaining public
trust interests in water); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d
588, 597 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[I]t has long been recognized that wildlife are protected by the
public trust doctrine.”).
Coghlan & Cullenward, supra note 6, at 248 (arguing that the notion of a state having a
property right in air is “inconsistent with atmospheric physics”). While I think Coghlan and
Cullenward are wrong on this point, I also think their article is generally excellent.
See CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2009) (“All water flowing in any natural channel . . . is
hereby declared to be public water of the State . . . .”).
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
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In short, a combination of precedent, principle, and common sense
establishes that the air must be a public resource. As one commentator explained,
“normal legal reasoning supports claims that the atmosphere lies within the
public trust; the absence of precedent on this point is a testament to the prior
lack of need to specify the nature of ownership of atmosphere.”94 To put the
same point more colloquially, existing law and common sense both follow
the same obvious intuition that leads us to refer to the molecules and space above
us not as “mine,” but as “our air.”95
Because air is public, the state, as the public’s representative, has every right
to demand compensation when it allows that air to be polluted for private
gain. We would not think twice if California chose to auction easements to
harvest timber on, or drill natural gas beneath, state lands.96 So long as the
public owns the resources at stake, and so long as it adopts auction charges
through appropriate legal processes, those charges would strike most viewers as
garden-variety good governance. Indeed, to do anything other than charge
market rates (or not sell the resources at all) would be the legally questionable
course. The atmosphere should be no different. The state, acting on behalf of
the public, is well within its rights charging fair-market-value fees to entities
that would dispose their wastes in the public’s air.
III.

AIR AUCTIONS AND RESOURCE POLITICS

If California’s emissions auction involves the state conveying privileges to
use public resources in return for market-rate fees, that raises a few interesting
subsidiary questions. First, why did the state not do this sooner? After all, air
pollution is not a new phenomenon, yet before AB 32, California had never
auctioned off air pollution entitlements. One might also ask whether the that
history of non-use reflects some legal limitation on the use of auctions. Second,
if air is indeed a public resource, what are the secondary implications of that
status? Does classification as a public resource lead to additional—and perhaps
undesirable—obligations for the state?
This last part considers these two questions. The response to the first, in
brief, is that while governments often take a long time to begin securing fair
94.
95.
96.

J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A Future Convergence?,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 926 (2012).
See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[L]ead particulate
emissions from gasoline engines account for approximately 90 percent of the lead in our air.”
(emphasis added)).
Or, at least, we would not question the state’s ability to seek those charges. There might be
questions about whether the state could or should auction off its resources at all.
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market value for public resources, if they ever do so at all, the reasons for that
delay are typically political and practical, not legal.97 The slow move toward
auctioning air pollution rights therefore reflects a familiar and often-repeated
political story, not some legal infirmity with auctions. In answer to the second
question, the secondary implications of recognizing air’s status as a public
resource should not be troubling. Such status obligates the state to steward the
public’s resources with care, but that obligation is nothing threatening or new.
A.

The Difficult Transition Away From Open Access

In the late nineteenth century, in a legal shift with parallels in the present
day, the U.S. government began to restrict resource access in the American
West.98 For many years, pioneers had been able to acquire natural resources
rather cheaply, if not for free.99 Timber harvesters stripped the upper Midwest
and then western forests, often paying nothing even though they operated on
public lands.100 Livestock ranged across the public domain, and shepherds
and cattlemen initially paid no compensation to the domain’s owners.101
Miners extracted gold and other minerals without paying royalties, and they
used huge volumes of water, all of which they diverted from public waterways
without paying the public a dime.102 While some resource users paid to obtain
title to the lands they exploited (others just took the resources without
seeking title to the lands), the prices were extremely low, and the flat per-acre
rates did not factor in the value of the resources the new landowners hoped to

97.

See generally Huber, supra note 72 (explaining the political challenges associated with securing fair
market value for public resources).
98. For general discussion of this transition, see CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT
MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1992).
99. See Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 991, 1023–
33 (2014).
100. See WILKINSON, supra note 98, at 120–22; Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land:
Three Nearly Forgotten Cases That Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279, 2292–
94 (1996).
101. As one court described:
All the neighbors who had settled near one of these prairies or on it, and all the
people who had cattle that they wished to graze upon the public lands, permitted
them to run at large over the whole region, fattening upon the public lands of the
United States and upon the uninclosed lands of the private individual without let
or hindrance.
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 327 (1890).
102. See Huber, supra note 72, at 1534; WILKINSON, supra note 98, at 241–42 (noting that western
water users took their water for free).
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extract.103 The result was a historical period often referred to as “The Great
Barbecue,” when massive quantities of public resources shifted to private
hands, with millions of acres of damaged landscapes left behind.104 In
modern terms, it was a classic “tragedy of the commons.”105
Nineteenth-century policymakers had their reasons for endorsing that
barbecue. Many wanted to encourage western expansion and economic growth;
some stood to personally benefit; and some realized that federal and state
governments, with their limited resources, would struggle to enforce stricter
controls.106 Many natural resources also initially seemed inexhaustible, and the
notion that we might run out struck observers as bizarre.107 But the regime
could not, and did not, last. The federal government reserved timberlands,
restricted cutting levels, and began to auction off timber harvesting contracts
through competitive bids.108 Competitive bidding processes were introduced to
manage coal, oil, and natural gas extraction.109 Concerned about massive
overgrazing, the federal government first restricted grazing rights and then
instituted a system of grazing fees.110
These shifts did not happen smoothly. Resource users, many of whom had
become accustomed to and deeply invested in free access, often vigorously
opposed the changes.111 Indeed, that opposition continues to the present day,
and is often effective.112 Entrenched, focused, and moneyed interests tend to fare

103. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 79 (1956) (“Throughout most of the [nineteenth]
century the national and state governments sold their land with no adequate regard to the special
resources in soils, minerals, or timber which might make particular tracts of extraordinary value.”).
See SARA DANT, LOSING EDEN: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST
65–80 (2017).
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) (arguing that management
of shared resources is doomed to tragedy unless regulation intervenes).
See DANT, supra note 104, at 65–80.
See, e.g., Shannon Carroll, Comment, Sector Allocation: A Misguided Solution, 17 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 163, 167 (2011) (describing the tragically misguided perception that fisheries were
inexhaustible).
See Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber
Auctions, 109 J. POL. ECON. 375, 376 (2001) (describing the United States Forest Service’s
bidding process).
See Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, Auctioning Resource Rights, 6 ANN. REV.
RESOURCE ECON. 175 (2014) (describing oil and gas leasing); Huber, supra note 72, at 1522–
28 (describing, and critiquing, federal coal leasing).
See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 85, at 1042–46.
See, e.g., id. at 1083 (noting opposition to grazing fees); WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE
BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS 64–67 (1992) (critiquing western opposition to
resource regulation).
See, e.g., Mark Jaffe, What Does a Trump Administration Mean for Western Public Lands?, DENVER
POST (Jan. 23, 2017, 3:38 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/26/the-really-real-world-
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quite well in political battles, and the history of western resource use provides a
litany of examples of that reality.113 Consequently, across much of the West,
governmental resources continue to flow into private hands at prices well
below market rates.114 But while shifting to paid access can be politically
difficult, past governmental policies of free, or nearly free, giveaways provided no
legal guarantee of future open access. Instead, as the U.S. Supreme Court once
explained, the federal government’s “failure to object . . . did not confer any
vested right on [resource users], nor did it deprive the United States of the
power of recalling any implied license under which the land had been used for
private purposes.”115
California’s air pollution policies are just the latest episode in this history—
they repeat, for air, a set of trends that played out earlier for many other public
resources. The substance of the shift is similar, as were its stages. Much as the
federal and state governments did with land, minerals, grass, and timber,
California began with a policy of open access, in which air pollution could be
emitted largely without restraint. It then moved to a policy of limited but still
free access, with regulatory controls but no charges. Most recently, the state
shifted to its current policy of regulatory controls and partial charges. The
reasons for California’s evolving approach to air pollution also closely resemble
the motivations for earlier efforts to protect public resources. California
realized that the use of a public resource was harming the public, and while the
state could still allow some harmful use, there is no reason why the state should
allow it for free.116 The opposition, as evidenced by the current litigation,
pursued similar strategies as well. But most importantly, the same basic legal
principle should govern the controversy about the shift to emissions auctions.
The fact that California for generations gave away, for free, the right to
pollute its air does not convert its present auction charges into taxes.
Instead, those charges are a familiar (and rather restrained) transition away from
an era of free access.

113.
114.
115.
116.

could-temper-a-trump-interior [http://perma.cc/CRX8-4UR8] (describing the Trump
Administration’s interest in a resurgence of resource extraction); cf. William Chaloupka, The
County Supremacy and Militia Movements: Federalism as an Issue on the Radical Right, 26 PUBLIUS
161 (1996) (describing resistance to federal governance).
See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (arguing
that small, coordinated groups with strong interests have political advantages over larger groups
with more diffuse interests).
See generally Huber, supra note 72 (summarizing this history).
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (West 2014) (describing the risks and harms
associated with climate change).
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Beyond establishing that the move from free access to charges is nothing
new, this brief history of public resource use underscores another important
point. It would be sadly ironic if, after California finally took an important step
toward respecting the public right in a vital natural resource, the courts
undermined the auction program by reclassifying its charges as taxes. The
politics of public resource management are hard enough without additional and
artificial legal hurdles.
B.

Stopping Points?

Suppose a court were to acknowledge that emissions auctions are
transactions, not taxes. This raises one last question: What other obligations
would flow from that legal recognition, and are they problematic? A lawyer
representing the state or regulated entities might initially have concerns. In a
set of cases referred to as “atmospheric trust litigation,”117 environmental
plaintiffs are currently pressing the claim that the atmosphere is a public trust
resource—not just a public resource—and that its status as a public trust resource
obligates state courts to order major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.118
For states, that litigation might raise fears of collateral consequences: will
acknowledging that air is a public resource lead inexorably to exacting judicial
oversight of its management?119
The answer is no; the fears would be largely ungrounded. Even if a court
were to hold that the atmosphere is indeed a public trust resource, that
outcome would neither remove states’ discretion to manage their air in sensible
ways, nor transfer oversight from legislatures and agencies to the courts.120
California’s experience managing other public trust resources illustrates why. For

117. Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Across the World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND
THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 99 (Ken Coghill et al. eds., 2012).

118. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (rejecting motions to dismiss

an atmospheric trust claim).
119. See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A

READER (W.H. Rodgers Jr. et al. eds., 2011) (describing a strategy in which judicial
intervention would displace agency discretion).
120. In my view, the atmospheric trust litigants offer powerful policy and common sense-based
arguments in favor of treating air as a public trust resource, but their doctrinal arguments
are weak. While there are compelling arguments that the public trust doctrine should
extend to air, and to many other public resources, there is little judicial authority directly
supporting that move. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556–57 (1970). Of course,
even if air is not a public trust resource, it still should be managed in ways that serve public
interests. See supra note 73 (citing other legal doctrines supporting the general principle
that public resources should be managed for public benefit).
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decades, California has managed its navigable waterways and their tributaries as
public trust resources.121 That status has affected state management of water
resources, primarily by giving state agencies an additional basis for protecting
public interests in waterways and a reminder of the importance of that
protection, but it has not led to a loss of administrative flexibility or a judiciary
run amok.122 Instead, in a 2012 study of California public trust litigation and
administrative decision-making, I found that no evidence of public trust claims
leading to anything that might be described as judicial activism.123 Similar
outcomes are likely for air. Recognizing its public character will empower
government managers to protect the atmosphere, but that recognition will not
snare managers in webs of hyper-legalized constraint.
CONCLUSION
The future of California’s emissions auctions is still uncertain. Revenues
have fluctuated wildly.124 Although carbon emissions are declining, the role of
the emissions auction, and the cap-and-trade program more generally, in driving
those reductions is difficult to separate from the role of AB 32’s other
measures.125 Despite these issues, the 2017 passage, with a supermajority vote, of
legislation authorizing the auction affirms that the auction will probably remain
a key part of California’s system of greenhouse gas regulation for years to
come.126 But it is also possible that California will turn to some other regulatory
method.127 But whatever course the people of California—or some other
121. See Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its Future, 45

U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665 (2012) (summarizing the history of California’s public trust doctrine).
122. See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45

123.
124.

125.

126.
127.

U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2012) (“In the post-1983 California freshwater cases available on
Lexis and Westlaw, no court has cited the public trust doctrine as a reason for ordering anyone to
do anything.”).
Id. at 1151.
Interestingly, some evidence suggests those fluctuations are partly due to litigation uncertainty. See,
e.g., Dale Kasler, California Climate Program Has Struggled. Why the Billion-Dollar Rebound?,
SACRAMENTO BEE (May 24, 2017, 12:47 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article152407344.html [http://perma.cc/7BCN-LE8K].
Compare Michael Hiltzik, California’s Cap-and-Trade Program Has Cut Pollution. So Why Do
Critics Keep Calling It a Failure?, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2016, 12:55 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-captrade-20160728-snap-story.html
[http://perma.cc/DM5B-YYHW] (crediting the cap-and-trade program for causing emissions
reductions), with Coghlan & Cullenward, supra note 6, at 236 (arguing that other regulatory
measures and a shift of high-carbon energy away from California account for most of the
apparent emissions reductions).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See Coghlan & Cullenward, supra note 6 (describing uncertainties in future greenhouse gas
regulation and potential policy responses).
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jurisdiction—choose, they have every right to charge for entitlements to pollute
public air. That prerogative should not disappear because courts classify
resource use charges as taxation.

